Do AI chatbots spread Russian disinformation about Ukraine?
Russia's 2026 budget sets aside $1.8B for state media. We test whether those claims surface in ChatGPT, Gemini, Grok and other AI assistants, then publish the evidence.
$1.8B covers state television, news agencies and online projects in Russia's 2026 federal budget (The Moscow Times). External figure, not a Citere measurement.
Updated · Open data, CC BY 4.0 · How we measure
How often each assistant stated a false claim as fact · pooled across all four ways of asking · 48 published claims
Where we test
All countries →We test AI assistants in 14 countries, each in the language people there actually use. That shows whether the same false claim gets a different answer in a different language. The 13 countries with a completed run are shown here; the rest are queued and appear on the countries page. Differences between countries are often small — open a country page for the detail. Austria and Germany share a language but count separately.
Turkey
Czechia
Spain
Netherlands
United States
Denmark
Austria
Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
Poland
France
Ukraine
What we found
All 48 claims →The claims we documented most recently. Each card carries our verdict, what is actually true underneath, and how many assistants stated it as fact anyway. Open one for the answers themselves: the question asked, the market, and what the assistant cited.
Anchorage Peace Agreement Blocked
Europe pushes Kyiv to provoke US-Russia diesel deal
Russia observes international law in Ukraine conflict
Ukraine controls Moldova's water supply
NATO nuclear strike testing claim
Fake Danish Analyst Quote on EU Border Closure
How AI assistants respond to false claims
All rankings →Worst case so far: one assistant stated a false claim as fact in 7.7% of its answers (Google AI Overviews) — pooled across all four ways of asking.
The same claims read three ways: the share by country, then each assistant and each kind of lie. Every figure is the share of answers that stated a false claim as fact, pooled across all four ways of asking — one headline number, not the per-question rate the data pages report. These are shares from our own tests, not a measure of an assistant's overall accuracy.
Where the claims spread most pooled across all question types
Share of answers that stated a false claim as fact. The same claims everywhere, asked in each country’s own language.
Assistants that repeat it most often pooled across all question types
Each assistant's share across every question type and market. Same claims, asked in each market’s own language.
Which kind of false claim spreads most pooled across all question types
How the false claim is attached to a true fact — from a pure invention to a real event with a single detail changed.
From the question to the published evidence
Methodology →Six steps, from the first question we put to an assistant to the re-measurement four weeks later.
We ask the questions
We ask each assistant the questions people ask about Ukraine. We record what it does with a documented false claim.
We check the sources
We take every source the assistant cited and match it against our versioned watchlist of domains.
We publish the finding
Each claim gets a permanent page: our verdict, the evidence, and what is genuinely true underneath.
We report it
We send findings to the platforms, and listed domains to registrars, hosts and CERT partners.
We confirm with partners
We share everything with Ukrainian institutions and fact-checkers, and link their findings.
We test again
Four weeks later we run the identical questions and publish the before and after.
How you can check us
Every figure here traces back to the evidence behind it. Every statement about a platform traces back to the message we sent it, and the reply.
Corrections and updates
Errors are fixed on the page and listed in the changelog.
How corrections work →